Relevant Statutes

  • 18 U.S.C. § 2 - Aiding and Abetting

  • 18 U.S.C. § 3 - Accessory After the Fact

  • 18 U.S.C. § 4 - Misprision of a Felony

  • 18 U.S.C. § 152 - Concealment of Assets; False Oaths and Claims; Bribery

  • 18 U.S.C. § 157 - Bankruptcy Fraud

  • 18 U.S.C. § 201 - Bribery of (Federal) Public Officials, Witnesses and Gratuities

  • 18 U.S.C. § 371 - Conspiracy to Commit Offense or to Defraud the United States

  • 18 U.S.C. § 641 - Theft of U.S. Money or Property

  • 18 U.S.C. § 654 - Embezzlement of U.S. Money or Property

  • 18 U.S.C. § 666 - Federal Program Fraud and Bribery

  • 18 U.S.C. § 669 - Health Care Embezzlement

  • 18 U.S.C. § 981 - Civil Forfeiture

  • 18 U.S.C. § 982 - Criminal Forfeiture

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1001 - False Statements

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1014 - False Statements to Banks

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1028 - Identification Documents Fraud

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1028A - Aggravated Identity Theft

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1030 - Unauthorized Use of a Protected Computer

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1031 - Major Fraud Against the United States

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1035 - False Statements Relating to Health Care Matters

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1341 - Mail Fraud

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1343 - Wire Fraud

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1344 - Bank Fraud

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1346 - Deprivation of Honest Services

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1347 - Health Care Fraud

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1503 - Influencing or Injuring Officer or Juror Generally

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1504 - Influencing Juror by Writing

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1505 - Obstruction of Proceedings Before Federal Department, Agency, or Committee

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1506 - Theft of Alteration of Record or Process

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1509 - Obstruction of Court Orders

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1510 - Obstruction of Criminal Investigation

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1511 - Obstruction of State of Local Law Enforcement

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1512 - Tampering with a Witness, Victim, or Informant

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1513 - Retaliation Against a Witness, Victim, or Informant

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1621 - Perjury

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1622 - Subornation of Perjury

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1623 - False Declarations Before Grand Jury or Court

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1831 - Economic Espionage

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1832 - Theft of Trade Secrets

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1951 - Interference with Commerce by Threats or Violence (Hobbs Act Extortion)

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1956 - Laundering of Monetary Instruments

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1957 - Engaging in Monetary Transaction in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1960 - Prohibition of Unlicensed Money Transmitting Businesses

  • 18 U.S.C. § 1962 - Racketeering (RICO)

  • 26 U.S.C. § 7201 - Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax

  • 26 U.S.C. § 7202 - Willful Failure to Collect or Pay Over Tax

  • 26 U.S.C. § 7203 - Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information, or Pay Tax

  • 26 U.S.C. § 7204 - Fraudulent Statement or Failure to Make Statement to Employees

  • 26 U.S.C. § 7205 - Fraudulent Withholding Exemption Certificate or Failure to Supply Information

  • 26 U.S.C. § 7206 - Fraud and False Statements

  • 26 U.S.C. § 7207 - Fraudulent Returns, Statements, or Other Documents

  • 31 U.S.C. § 3729 - False Claims Act

  • 31 U.S.C. § 3730 - Civil Actions for False Claims (Qui Tam)

  • 31 U.S.C. § 5324 - Structuring Transactions to Evade Reporting Requirements

  • 31 U.S.C. § 5331 - Reports Relating to Coins and Currency Received in Non-Financial Trade or Business

  • 31 U.S.C. § 5332 - Bulk Cash Smuggling Into or Out of the United States

  • 31 U.S.C. § 5335 - Prohibition on Concealment of the Source of Assets in Monetary Transactions

  • 31 U.S.C. § 5336 - Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Requirements

  • 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 - 1709 - International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)

Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of federal white-collar related statutes, but it is a good start!  One should also be aware that most states have companion statutes that mirror or closely duplicate most (but not all) federal white-collar statutes.  Please check with your individual state for more information.

For the benefit of Alaskans, as Denali Defense Solutions is an Alaska headquartered company, below are some relevant Alaska Statutes (AS) that can be relied upon in place of federal statutes listed above.  Please note, AS criminal statutes fall under Chapter 11 of the AS Code:

  • AS §§ 11.31.100 - 11.31.150 - Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy

  • AS §§ 11.56.100 - 11.56.130 - Bribery and Related Offenses 

  • AS §§ 11.56.200 - 11.56.240 - Perjury and Related Offenses

  • AS §§ 11.56.110 - 11.56.620 - Offenses Related to Judicial and Other Proceedings

  • AS §§ 11.56.850 - 11.56.870 - Abuse of Public Office

  • AS § 11.41.520 - Extortion

Relevant US Supreme Court Opinions​

McNally v. United States (1987)

McNally v. United States (1987) addressed the scope of the federal mail fraud statute. The case involved a scheme where Kentucky officials received kickbacks from insurance companies, depriving citizens of their right to honest government services. The Court ruled 7-2 that the mail fraud statute only applied to schemes involving tangible property rights, not intangible rights like honest government services. The majority opinion, written by Justice White, held that the statute's language and legislative history limited its scope to protecting property rights, not the public's right to good government.  The dissent, led by Justice Stevens, argued that the statute should be interpreted more broadly to include intangible rights, citing decades of lower court precedents. This decision significantly narrowed the application of the mail fraud statute, limiting prosecutors' ability to pursue corruption cases not involving direct monetary loss. It effectively overturned numerous convictions based on the "intangible rights" theory. In response, Congress quickly passed the "honest services fraud" statute in 1988, explicitly criminalizing schemes to deprive others of the intangible right to honest services. For investigators, this case emphasized the need to focus on tangible financial losses when building mail fraud cases. It also highlighted the importance of staying current with legislative changes, as Congress's swift action restored and clarified the statute's broader application to corruption cases.

McCormick v. United States (1991)

McCormick v. United States (1991) addressed whether campaign contributions could be considered extortion under the Hobbs Act without proof of an explicit quid pro quo. The case involved a West Virginia legislator who received payments from foreign doctors seeking favorable legislation. The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that an explicit quid pro quo is necessary for a Hobbs Act conviction involving campaign contributions. The majority opinion, written by Justice White, held that treating campaign contributions as extortion without clear evidence of an exchange agreement would put at risk legitimate political practices. The Court emphasized that only if payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not perform an official act can they be considered criminal under the Hobbs Act. The dissent, led by Justice Stevens, argued that requiring proof of an explicit quid pro quo would make it too difficult to prosecute corrupt officials. This ruling significantly narrowed the scope of the Hobbs Act in campaign finance cases, making it harder for prosecutors to bring charges based on campaign contributions. For investigators, this decision means they must gather clear evidence of an explicit agreement between the official and the contributor, linking the payment to a specific official action, rather than relying on circumstantial evidence or implied understandings.

Evans v. United States (1992)

In Evans v. United States (1992), the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a county commissioner for extortion under the Hobbs Act. The Court held that the government need not prove that a public official made an explicit demand or inducement to obtain a payment to which they were not entitled. The majority, in a 6-3 decision, ruled that the common law definition of extortion, which the Hobbs Act incorporated, did not require proof of a demand. The Court concluded that the coercive element is provided by the public office itself, and the government only needs to show that the official received a payment knowing it was in return for official acts. The dissent, led by Justice Thomas, argued that the majority's interpretation expanded the scope of the Hobbs Act beyond Congress's intent and that common law extortion required a false pretense of official right. They contended that the Court's ruling effectively criminalized voluntary payments to public officials. This decision broadened the application of the Hobbs Act, making it easier for prosecutors to bring extortion charges against public officials. It eliminated the need to prove an explicit quid pro quo arrangement. For investigators, this ruling simplified the evidence-gathering process, as they no longer needed to demonstrate that the official made a specific demand or threat. Instead, they could focus on proving that the official knowingly accepted payments in exchange for official acts, potentially increasing the number of successful prosecutions under the Hobbs Act.

United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California (1999)

In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California (1999), the Supreme Court unanimously ruled on the interpretation of the federal illegal gratuity statute. Sun-Diamond, a trade association, was charged with providing illegal gratuities to Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy. The government argued that proving a link between the gifts and specific official acts was unnecessary, while Sun-Diamond contended that such a link was required. The Court sided with Sun-Diamond, holding that to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), prosecutors must prove a connection between the gratuity and a specific official act. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, reasoned that a broad interpretation would criminalize innocent gift-giving and contradict the statute's language. The Court rejected the government's argument that the statute aimed to prevent appearance of impropriety, stating that Congress did not write such a sweeping prohibition. This decision narrowed the scope of the illegal gratuity statute, making it more challenging for prosecutors to secure convictions. There was no dissenting opinion. The ruling has significant implications for future investigations, as it requires investigators to establish a clear link between gifts and specific official acts, rather than merely proving that gifts were given because of an official's position. This higher evidentiary standard necessitates more thorough and targeted investigations to successfully prosecute illegal gratuity cases[1][2][4].

United States v. Skilling (2010)

In United States v. Skilling (2010), the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the "honest services" fraud statute and its application to former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling. The Court unanimously rejected Skilling's claim of jury prejudice but split on the honest services issue. In a 6-3 decision, the Court narrowed the scope of the statute to cover only bribery and kickback schemes, finding it would be unconstitutionally vague if applied more broadly. The majority, led by Justice Ginsburg, held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague when limited to these core offenses. The dissenting justices argued that the statute should be struck down entirely as too vague. This decision significantly restricted the government's ability to prosecute public corruption and corporate fraud cases under the honest services theory. It meant that many previously prosecutable actions, such as undisclosed self-dealing by public officials or executives, were no longer covered by the statute. For investigators, this ruling necessitated a more focused approach in corruption cases, requiring clear evidence of bribes or kickbacks rather than relying on vaguer notions of breached fiduciary duties. The decision also prompted a reevaluation of pending and past convictions based on the honest services statute, leading to the reversal or modification of several high-profile cases. Overall, Skilling v. United States reshaped the landscape of federal fraud prosecutions, demanding more specific evidence of criminal intent in cases involving alleged breaches of honest services.

McDonnell v. United States (2016)

In McDonnell v. United States (2016), the Supreme Court unanimously vacated former Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell's corruption convictions. The case centered on whether McDonnell's actions constituted "official acts" under federal bribery law. McDonnell argued that arranging meetings and hosting events for a businessman who provided gifts were not official acts, while prosecutors contended these actions fell within the statute's scope. The Court sided with McDonnell, narrowing the definition of "official act" to exclude routine political courtesies. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, held that an official act must involve a formal exercise of governmental power on a specific, focused matter. The Court found the jury instructions overly broad, potentially criminalizing innocent behavior. There was no dissenting opinion. The ruling significantly narrowed the interpretation of federal corruption laws, making it more challenging for prosecutors to prove bribery cases against public officials. The Court emphasized that merely setting up meetings or expressing support does not qualify as an official act without a showing of pressure to perform a government function. This decision has important implications for future corruption investigations, requiring prosecutors to demonstrate a more direct link between gifts and specific government actions. Investigators must now focus on gathering evidence of concrete government decisions or actions, rather than relying on general political favors or access, to build corruption cases against public officials.

Snyder v. United States (2024)​.  

Snyder v. United States (2024) significantly limited the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 666, a federal statute criminalizing corruption in state and local governments. The case involved James Snyder, a former Indiana mayor convicted of accepting a $13,000 payment after awarding city contracts. The Court ruled 6-3 that § 666 only prohibits bribes promised or given before an official act, not after-the-fact gratuities. The majority opinion, authored by Justice Kavanaugh, cited statutory text, history, structure, punishments, federalism principles, and fair notice considerations to support this interpretation. The dissent, led by Justice Jackson, argued that the statute's use of "rewarded" clearly covers after-the-fact payments and criticized the majority's narrow reading. This decision narrows the application of § 666, requiring prosecutors to prove a corrupt agreement existed before the official act. It may lead to fewer federal prosecutions of state and local corruption cases, potentially leaving more to state authorities. The ruling also raises questions about its impact on other federal anti-corruption statutes, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. For investigators, this decision means they must focus on gathering evidence of pre-existing agreements in bribery cases, potentially through more extensive witness interviews and document collection. The ruling emphasizes the need for clear evidence of quid pro quo arrangements in corruption investigations involving state and local officials.​